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RECENT CASES
tax should not be levied. Commonwealth v. Lancaster Savings Bank, 123
Mass. 493; State v. Bradford Bank, 71 Vt. 234, 44 Atl. 349. The New
Jersey cases to the contrary seem to go too far. In re United States Car
Co., 6o N. J. Eq. 514, 43 Atl. 673. Although it is not quite clear against
whom the tax should be assessed, this difficulty appears purely formal. See
cases collected in L. R. A. i915 E, 218, 219. Priority for state taxes under
Virginia law is unquestionable. Thomas v. Jones, 94 Va. 756, 27 S. E. 813.
Priority for taxes is normally treated as a question of procedure, and so de-
termined by the lex fori. Central Trust Co. v. E. Tenn., V. & G. Ry., 69
Fed. 658 (C. C. N. D. Ga.). The New York law does not give priority to
taxes. Wise v. Wise & Co., i53 N. Y. 507, 47 N. E. 788. But since it evi-
dently has no strong policy against such priorities, the court was justified in
deciding as it did on grounds of comity. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§§ 29 et seq. A divergence in this policy and a difference on the facts ac-
counts for the court's disregard of a contrary holding in Franklin Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 18i Fed. 769 (1st Circ.). See Arthur M. Brown, "Comity
in the Federal Courts," 28 HARv. L. REv. 589.
TENANCY IN COMMON - PURCHASE OF PROPERTY BY CO-TENANT AFTER
EXPIRATION OF STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE.- The
plaintiff and the defendant were husband and wife, owning land as tenants
in common. In 1921 the property was sold at a tax sale to X. Two years
later, after the statutory period of redemption had expired, the defendant
paid the amount of the taxes to X, who conveyed the land to the defendant
as her separate estate. Throughout this time and until 1924, the plaintiff
and the defendant lived together on this land. In 1924 they were divorced,
no mention being made of the property in the divorce proceedings. In this
suit by the plaintiff to recover an undivided one-half interest in the property,
the trial court decreed that the land be sold, and that after deducting the
amount paid by the defendant for the repurchase, one-half the proceeds be
paid to the plaintiff. From this decree the defendant appealed. Held, that
the purchase of a tax title by one co-tenant, even after the period of re-
demption has expired, inures to the benefit of all the co-tenants. Judgment
affirmed. Bush v. Bush, 275 S. W. io96 (Tex. Civ. App.).
A co-tenant who buys in property at a tax sale or redeems from another
who bought it in, does so for the benefit of all co-tenants. Sanders v.
Sanders, 145 Ark. i88, 224 S. W. 732. Cf. Collins v. Collins, 59 Hun 620,
13 N. Y. Supp. 28, aff'd, 131 N. Y. 648, 30 N. E. 863. The reason given
for this rule is the relation of mutual trust and confidence. If no fiduciary
relation in fact exists, the result should be otherwise. See Stevens v.
Reynolds, 143 Ind. 467, 477, 41 N. E. 931, 934. And see 9 HARv. L. REv.
427. When the time of redemption has expired, the fiduciary relationship
is generally regarded as having ceased, and one who was a co-tenant may
purchase for himself. Lewis v. Robinson, io Watts (Pa.) 354. See Watkins
v. Eaton, 30 Me. 529, 536; Kirkpatrick v. Mathiot, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 251,
254. And see TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 172. Whatever may be said of
the doctrine that a fiduciary relation arises out of a co-tenancy per se, its
existence in the principal case can hardly be questioned, where husband and
wife were living together on the land. It would seem, furthermore, that this
fiduciary relation was properly held to have continued as long as the parties
remained in joint possession, despite the expiration of the redemption period.
TORTS - CoNsPIRACY- INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE OR BUSINESs.-At
the instance of a union of retail news-agents of which he was a member, the
plaintiff, formerly a customer of R, a wholesale news-agent, transferred his
custom to W, another wholesaler. The union requested this action because
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R was supplying newspapers to a dealer who had opened a shop in violation
of a so-called "distance limit policy" of the union. The defendants were
a committee representing the publishers and considered the "distance limit
policy" as injurious to their interests. In order to compel the plaintiff to
return to R, the defendants threatened to cut off the supplies W obtained
from them directly and also to quit supplying S, another distributor who
had dealings with W, as long as W continued to supply the plaintiff. The
plaintiff brought suit for an injunction, which was granted in the lower court.
The decree was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and the plaintiff appealed
to the House of Lords. Held, that the defendants had not committed nor
threatened to commit any wrong against the plaintiff. Appeal dismissed.
Sorrel v. Smith, [1925] A. C. 700.
The House of Lords was unanimous in holding that the plaintiff did not
have a cause of action. Two cases were chiefly relied on. Mogul Steamship
Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A. C. 25; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. I. The
opinions, however, do not agree how the present case should be distinguished
from one in which a somewhat similar conspiracy was held actionable. See
Quinn v. Leathem, [i9oi] A. C. 495. Various grounds are taken: that the
defendants in the principal case acted without malevolence or spite; that
the real purpose of the combination was to promote the defendants' trade
and therefore justifiable; that there was no actionable conspiracy, i.e., no
combination 'for the sole purpose of inflicting injury. This disagreement
demonstrates that very few rules or principles have yet crystallized in this
branch of the law. On the facts of each case a judgment must be passed,
whether, in view of, the end sought to be attained by the defendant, the
means he employs should be considered as improper. That judgment will
reflect the social and economic policy of the community as understood by
the court. For a full discussion of the principles involved, see 2 HAlv. L.
REV. 19; 15 ibid. 427; 16 ibid. 237; 20 ibid. 253, 345, 429; 37 ibid. 143;38 ibid. 121.
UNFAIR COMPETITION - NECESSITY OF TRADING ON PLAINTIFF'S GOOD
WiL - MISREPRESENTATIONS USED TO DECEIVE THE PUBLIc. - The plain-
tiff, by virtue of a patent, alone could sell safes containing an explosion
chamber. The defendant falsely represented that his safes contained an
explosion chamber, thereby diverting customers from the plaintiff. The
public were not led to believe that the plaintiff manufactured the safes.
From a decree dismissing the complaint the plaintiff appealed. Held, that
the defendant's misrepresentations entitled the plaintiff to an injunction.
Decree reversed. Ely-Morris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F. (2d) 603
(2nd Circ.).
Though unfair competition is an elastic term, it has usually been confined
to cases where the defendant is trading on the reputation and good will of
the plaintiff. See 38 HARv. L. REV. 370. No such situation is here presented.
Relief is given although the defendant's misrepresentation concerned merely
his own goods, and did not in any way relate to the plaintiff. Contra,
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Circ.).
The court concerns itself with the defendant's wrong and not the plaintiff's
right. Cf. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215.
See Bruce Wyman, "Competition and the Law," 15 HARv. L. REV. 427.
If the competition is unfair, the plaintiff seems clearly entitled to relief
if he can show loss of customers. This can be done in the present case,
since the plaintiff had a patent on the article in question. In the ab-
sence of this circumstance it is doubtful whether the plaintiff could show
sufficient injury. What competitive methods are unfair, depends on views
of public policy, trade morality and economic soundness. See Howe Scale
